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THE  CONCEPT  OF  KNOWLEDGE  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  ELECTRONIC
NETWORKING
We know a lot more about the epistemology of the net at the time the present summary is
being  written  (January  1997)  than  we  did  two  years  ago  when  the  topic  of  this
collaboration was decided upon. In part, this increase in knowledge is a consequence of
the tremendous development of the net itself; in part, however, it is a consequence of our
own series of exchanges. I would like, therefore, to say that the project had a positive
outcome; but to say this would be misleading.
It would be misleading, first, because in conceptual terms our results are mainly negative.
We have reached important results as to how not to address the problem of knowledge on
the net; and as to what that problem is not. But we were not successful in finding new,
positive, concepts. And I think I know now that here we were condemned from the start to
failure.
Secondly, the outcome was negative in the sense that an electronic discussion did not
actually  emerge.  This  is  the  reason  for  my  using  the  circumlocution  "a  series  of
exchanges." Of course we employed e-mail and mailing lists; of course texts were there in
a digitized form, and available instantaneously. But the topic for discussion I had originally
proposed  -  a  conventional  philosophical  topic  was  just  not  fit  to  be  discussed  in  a
networked environment. Certainly there is room - or should we say time? - for philosophy
on the net. Indeed the net needs its philosophers. But they, and their problems, belong to
a world entirely different from the world of philosophy as we knew it. This, I suggest, is the
main lesson we have learned from this project.
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And here is how it began, with a text I mailed to the "mii-ckcn" list in January 1996:
Dear Colleagues:
It was agreed that our discussion - like all other discussions envisaged for the "Monist
Interactive Issue" - should begin with the moderator mailing what is usually called a "target
paper."  The moderator  (that  is,  me)  should  have done this  long ago -  by  the end of
October last, in fact. Now the present text, I am afraid, is still  not the paper you were
promised. Perhaps there will be no such paper at all - perhaps the discussion will have to
emerge  from  more  spontaneous  beginnings.  The  reason:  As  time  goes  on,  I  find  it
increasingly difficult to adhere to the views I have held for the past few years - without,
however, having arrived at some settled, alternative, position. In particular the views I had
defended in my 1994 paper "Electronic Networking and the Unity of Knowledge" have
ceased to satisfy me. (For bibliographical  references see below.)  I  have come to feel
disturbed by the typographical bias of those views - especially after having read Talbott's
The Future Does Not Compute. Talbott entertains an obsolete notion of what it means to
have  meaningful  knowledge;  his  philosophical  anthropology  is  quite  ahistorical;  so
ahistorical it made me take issue with what I now recognize to be a latent ahistoricity in
my own former approach. I am not saying everything in "Electronic Networking and the
Unity of Knowledge" was wrong (indeed I would be pleased if some of you would want, at
some stage, to have a look at it - I am mailing the text to you simultaneously with this
one); but its argument had presupposed a timeless validity of certain ideals which in fact,
as I now see, are bound up with the age of the printed book.
If my own views, then, are in flux, the adequate way to convey them is, I would say, not by
making statements at all, but by formulating questions. And so here are some questions -
I invite you to react to them:
Assuming that the term "knowledge" has a whole cluster of meanings, most of them fuzzy,
how should one proceed when inquiring about what the notion of knowledge in the context
of electronic networking amounts to? Should one apply the methods of a non-ethnocentric
cultural anthropology so to speak, i.e. describe specific cognitive attitudes as manifested
in the linguistic habits of specific networking populations? Should one describe, that is,
some emerging new language games, or  forms of  life,  in  the Wittgensteinian sense -
describe new conceptual patterns, without paying attention to older ones? Or should one,
rather,  begin  precisely  with  an  articulation  and  analysis  of  those  older  patterns,  and
examine new usages in the framework of the former? My own choice would still be the
latter.
Assuming you accept this choice, what would an articulation of the hitherto established
meanings of the term "knowledge" look like? The first distinction perhaps could be that
between "knowing that" and "knowing how": that is, verbal or theoretical knowledge on the
one hand, and practical knowledge (skills, techniques) on the other. But then one would
immediately have to ask: how clearcut is this distinction? What is to be said, for example,
of  knowledge  conveyed  by  pictures  (images,  diagrams,  graphs,  maps)?  A  second  -
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related,  but  hardly  identical  -distinction  is  that  between  operative  and  contemplative
knowledge.  A  third  distinction  is  that  between  personal  knowledge  (in  the  sense  of
knowledge  possessed  by  some  individual)  and  collective  knowledge  (knowledge
possessed by a community, or by a culture). A fourth distinction could be made between
personal  knowledge  (in  the  sense  of  evaluative,  normative  knowledge)  and  objective
knowledge (in the sense of knowledge that is purely descriptive, factual). Are these useful
distinctions? What other distinctions would be relevant? And should one also distinguish
between knowledge and "information?" Is knowledge entirely different from information, or
is the former a special case of the latter?
Am I right in believing that the nature of knowledge - or if you prefer: the way in which
different notions of knowledge emerge, flourish, and become obscure - is not independent
of  the  technologies  by  which  knowledge  is  communicated  and  preserved?  What
connections do obtain here?
And  what  effect,  then,  has  the  technology  of  electronic  networking  on  the  nature  of
knowledge? What  are  the  relevant  dimensions  of  changes in  the  communication  and
preservation of knowledge when computer networking supplants the printed text? (And
what is the correct expression here: "supplanting" or "complementing"?)
It  seems obvious  to  me that  one such relevant  dimension  of  change pertains  to  our
experience, and concept, of time; to the temporal context within which we conceive of
present contents of communication; to the mode, in particular, in which we experience and
handle  the  past.  Important  observations  have  been  made,  for  instance,  about  the
changing notion of archiving (Hedstrom; Bearman). And at the time I read it I was deeply
impressed by Birkerts' book Gutenberg Elegies, bewailing our "fragmented sense of time"
and our "divorce from the past, from a vital sense of history as a cumulative or organic
process." I am still impressed; but I am not convinced anymore.
The point Birkerts is making is that we are losing the historical consciousness that for
many centuries distinguished the Western mind. But are we really losing something? At
the  time  I  wrote  my  paper  "Historical  Consciousness  in  the  Computer  Age"  (1990)  I
certainly believed that we are. Today I think that what we lose is perhaps just an obsolete
ideal. Perhaps we are gaining, as Nietzsche had thought, a new freedom to deal with the
present in a practical spirit.
And historical consciousness of course is just one among the many contestable ideals:
the ideals of originality, individuality, privacy, unity of knowledge, objectivity, and absolute
truth. I think these ideals should not be interpreted and evaluated independently of the
social fabric from which they emerged and with which they were, and are, bound up. A
discussion about the concept of knowledge in the context of electronic networking should
at  all  times  also  be  a  discussion  about  the  kind  of  society  electronic  networking  is
enabling, or not enabling, us to build; the kind of life it furthers, or excludes.
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The "mii-ckcn" list was by this time widely publicized on the net, there had been inquiries,
people had subscribed - the above text must have reached many a screen. But it did not
elicit a single response. So on April 14, 1996, I decided on a new beginning. I re-mailed
the target paper, along with the text of my "Unity of Knowledge" paper, to a circle of some
twenty colleagues. Two of them I had become acquainted with via e-mail; the rest were
personal acquaintances - colleagues and students, from Hungary and from abroad. I had
asked them to reply to me directly, indicating that the mii-ckcn list had been for the time
being frozen.
In the course of the next four weeks two of the addressees replied. One was Dr. Michael
Biggs of the School of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire, UK. Michael in fact
commented on a passage in the "Unity of Knowledge" paper; so let me first quote that
passage from the Networking in the Humanities volume (pp. 261ff.):
Before  the  age  of  printing,  pictures  and  diagrams  played  only  a  limited  role.  ...  The
Romans used simple pictures, called emblems, to help them overcome the inherent visual
deficiency of their scripts:[ 1] they recalled specific parts of a text by remembering the
particular  emblem  placed  against  it  in  the  margin.  In  early  medieval  manuscripts
illustrations helped readers to find the part of the text they were looking for. Applied in this
manner,  pictures  had  a  merely  auxiliary  function;  and  even  that  was  lost  with  the
introduction of word-separation. As Saenger points out, this invention gave written Latin
an ideographic value without sacrificing the inherent pedagogic advantages of a phonetic
alphabet? Pictures now ceased to be needed as visual aids. And prior to printing they
could not become aids to the communication of knowledge. Since they were inevitably
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distorted in the copying process, information could not be preserved by them. With the
advent of printing this changed. But even then, texts could be manipulated with much
greater ease, both by the author and especially by the printer,  than could pictures ....
Illustrations played, on the whole, a subordinate role; and pictures as vehicles of thinking
played almost no role at all. Sometimes this was felt to be a possible loss. Thus Bacon
wrote:  "Aristotle  saith  well,  'Words  are  the  images  of  cogitations,  and  letters  are  the
images of  words.'  But  yet  it  is  not  of  necessity  that  cogitations  be expressed by  the
medium  of  words.  For  whatsoever  is  capable  of  sufficient  differences,  and  those
perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to express cogitations."[ 3]
This is the issue Richard Lanham today confronts when he says that scholarly argument
should  use  images  "to  think  through,  conceptualize,  problems  rather  than  simply  to
illustrate solutions arrived at through other means;"4 or the issue Michael Ester addresses
when  he  speaks  about  "arrangements  of  images  as  a  way  to  think."5  The  Lanham
reference is to the perspectives opened up by the possibility of manipulating images on
the screen. But already in the late age of print the programme of a better integration of
text and images appeared as a conceivable aim, say, to Otto Neurath. "Frequently it is
very  hard,"  he  wrote,  "to  say  in  words  what  is  clear  straight  away  to  the  eye.  It  is
unnecessary to say in words what we are able to make clear by pictures."[ 6] Neurath was
working towards an "International System of Typographic Picture Education," abbreviated
as isotype, an interdependent and interconnected system of images, to be used together
with  word  languages,  yet  having  a  visual  logic  of  its  own.  Isotype  would  be
two-dimensional,  using  distinctive  conventions,  shapes,  colours,  and  so  on.  Neurath
particularly stressed that the elaboration of this picture language was meant to serve a
broader  aim,  that  of  establishing  an  international  encyclopaedia  of  common,  united
knowledge - the "work of our time," he said - and in this connection he specifically referred
to the French Encyclopaedia which "gave a great amount of material and a great number
of pictures, but there was only a loose connection between them."7
And this is what Michael Biggs wrote:
In support of the importance of the re-emergence of imagery in thinking we have several
levels of use. The most passive use is non-integrated illustrations which simply repeat
what is said in the text. This is the case with Diderot and the French Encyclopedie. Then
we have Neurath who for efficiency's sake does not wish to say in words what can be
better, more persuasively or more easily said in pictures.8 There is not necessarily an
implication here that there are some things which can ONLY be said in illustrations. Then
there is a functionalist argument by Lanham and Ester[ 9] to the effect that visual thinking
offers tools that textual thinking does not. Such an observation is more than an efficiency
argument. In a similar manner, Wittgenstein contrasts the case of being persuaded by
words with our inability to then argue the contrary with images.[  10] This is not to be
confused with Wittgenstein's distinction between "saying" and "showing" in the Tractatus.[
11] This distinction in the Tractatus is a structural matter, where what is "shown" underlies
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what is "said." What is shown is ineffable? but not because it refers to visual practice, e.g.
ostensive  definition.  That  ineffability  belongs  to  Wittgenstein's  later  work  which
emphasises practice[ 13] and in which "mental pictures" are unnecessary constructs. The
emerging dominance of visual reasoning leads on to the idea that words such as "proof"
can be described as "a single picture."14 That is important, not because picturing and
proof are synonymous, but because it leads us away from the temptation to think that a
proof is telling us something about essences in contrast to a pictorial diagram which is a
paradigm but not necessarily an essence.[ 15]
The  issue  for  electronic  text  is,  then,  that  concepts  are  underpinned  by  nonlinguistic
practice. This has been hindered by the dominance of textual communication and is likely
to  be  overcome  by  the  visual  opportunities  of  forms  on  the  Internet  which  have
advantages over straightforward text and text-string (e-mail) communication. The limit is a
conceptual  one,  that  we do not  have a  set  of  analytical  tools  for  graphics  which are
comparable  to  those  for  text.  For  example,  we  can  organise  and  structure  texts  in
conventional ways based on practice, but no such corresponding uniformity of practice
and hence of analysis can be applied to images. Thus Wittgenstein can express surprise
in  recognition  of  a  likeness?  and  of  the  changes  undergone  when  an  image  is
accompanied by an expression of intention? This correspondence could be made explicit
via analytical tools comparable to those available to us with text. We cannot analyse the
physiognomy  of  pictures?  There  is  therefore  a  fundamental  disunity  between  visual
knowledge and textual/linguistic knowledge.
The relation between the logic of written text and the logic of pictures is clearly one of the
fundamental  issues  pertaining  to  the  problem  of  knowledge  on  the  Net.  And  here
philosophical progress will of course hardly occur as long as the investigations proceed in
merely one of the two domains involved - namely the verbal one. We will return to this
issue towards the conclusion of the present summary by way of reference to a paper by
Phil Mullins.
The second comment in this round came from Dr. Margit Pohl, Institute of Design and
Assessment of Technology, Social Cybernetics Group, Department of Computer Science,
Vienna  University  of  Technology.  (Margit  addresses  me  as  "Krist6f",  which  is  the
Hungarian version for "Christoph." Bear with me, dear reader: I was born and raised in
Hungary,  but  in  a German-speaking family,  and especially  when writing in German or
English I often sign my messages as "Christoph" - hence the "C." in "J. C.") And here is
Margit's (very slightly edited) text:
Kristof Nyiri sent us two papers as a starting point for a discussion. I want to make two
comments  referring  to  those  papers.  The  first  comment  deals  with  the  relationship
between  the  technology  of  writing  and  knowledge  representation  in  general,  and  the
second one with hypertext (as an example of a technology of writing) in particular.
1. The Target Paper. Here I will comment on points ( 3) and ( 4).
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I  think  it  is  quite  obvious  that  the  technology  of  writing  influences  human  forms  of
knowledge  representation.  On  the  other  hand  this  relationship  seems  to  be  rather
complex. Many features of knowledge representation which are supposed to be typical for
the electronic age already existed before the introduction of computer technology. Krist6f
himself often quotes Musil or Wittgenstein as early examples for networked, distributed
thinking and writing. Apparently, the influence of technology on the process of writing is
not direct and one-dimensional. There might be something like a philosophy of networking
influencing both the technology of  writing and the forms of  knowledge representation.
Rand Spiro,  a  well-known scientist  in  the  hypertext  community,  argues that  hypertext
technology is a method for coping with the complexity of modern life. In the context of his
theory, complexity, and not technology as such, is the reason for changes in knowledge
representation. Complexity is, then, regarded here as a sort of philosophical idea which
brings about technological and intellectual changes at the same time.
2. In his paper "Electronic Networking and the Unity of Knowledge" Krist6f writes: "The
now fashionable idea of treating all retrievable information as mere raw material out of
which  users  might  freely  establish  their  own  preferred  hypertext  structures  is  an
acceptance  of  the  fragmented  state  of  knowledge,  not  a  solution  to  the  problems  it
creates."
I agree with Krist6f insofar as it is one feature of Hypertext that it enables readers to find
their own paths through the jungle of knowledge. In some situations, this can be very
confusing. Nevertheless, Hypertext is more than that. Hypertext also enables its authors
to represent the structure of a text more explicitly. Overview cards in a graphical form can
fulfill this function. If authors use typed links they have to consider very carefully the exact
nature of the links they want to create. If a hypertext document is well structured, such a
form of representation can give the reader an overview of the material presented that is
much better than that provided by traditional books. Additionally, such an approach forces
authors to consider the overall organization of their text to a greater extent than is the
case with traditional linear text, where relationships between different parts of the text are
very often represented merely implicitly.
Hypertext is still a very "young" medium, therefore it remains to be seen if future hypertext
documents  will  be a  fragmented and disordered mess or  a  wellstructured but  flexible
object. It seems quite plausible that the two kinds of development will each affect human
reasoning in a different manner. I think this shows another major problem when talking
about  the  influence of  electronic  networking  on  knowledge representation  -  there  are
many different ways of using a computer.
On May 14, 1996, I again addressed the above-mentioned circle of twenty, sending them
Michael's and Margit's comments.
In my message I also included the text - in German, I am afraid - of an essay Herbert
Hrachovec had recently written, an essay I found highly pertinent. Its title was: "Zweimal
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funf  Prognosen  zur  Forschung  in  Computernetzen,"  i.e.  "two  times  five  forecasts
concerning research through computer networks." The essay contained a direct reference
to the Monist Interactive Issue project. I took up that reference in a talk I had given at
MUnster some days earlier; and closed my message of May 14 by quoting from the talk:
Hrachovec refers to the disturbing experiences he and I have had in the course of a joint
experiment which is still in progress. The Monist Interactive Issue Project is an attempt to
compile  a  special  issue  of  this  venerable  American  philosophical  periodical  by  using
discussions initiated and conducted on the Internet. I myself planned to direct a discussion
under the title "The Concept of Knowledge in the Context of Electronic Networking" and
have, in the course of the last few months, sent out into the great wide world an extensive
list of questions to be considered, as well as a lengthy document to accompany that list. I
have not received a single reply. At first, I was bewildered; today I think I understand.
There is no such thing as a concept of knowledge in the context of electronic networking.
All there is are procedures which one knows or does not know, or is not informed about; or
locations in the global hypertext one finds or does not find. The humanities of the future
will  not  have  a  Platonistic  outlook;  rather,  a  Wittgensteinian  one,  asking  not  for  the
meaning but for the use; or even a Heraclitean one - it is no accident that Wittgenstein, in
the 1930s, was so intensely interested in the Heraclitean question. It is the multimedia flux
of communication the humanities of the future will be striving to understand- to understand
and,  perhaps,  to  even bring to a halt,  if,  as I  believe,  the conventional  text  retains a
measure of functionality?
My Heraclitean fantasies were not without impact. Lasz1o Turi, Junior Research Fellow at
the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - the Institute where I,
too, happen to work - was so encouraged by them that he decided to join the discussion.
Turi is of course the author of one of the introductory essays to the present Monist issue,
so the reader will by now have the opportunity to become acquainted with some of his
views; here follow his slightly abridged -comments on my target paper. I received them on
May 20, 1996.
I recommend a threefold categorization of knowledge involved in digital technologies and
networking: ( 1) knowledge of how to acquire and use digital technologies, ( 2) knowledge
and  experience  of  the  past,  (  3)  knowledge  in  use,  that  is  the  access  to,  and
communication of, knowledge.
It is a common experience these days that people who consider themselves "the older
generation" find it more difficult to learn the use of a new technology than do the "young
folk." However, we have to admit that individual differences here are far more significant
than those related to age-groups: some older persons are more successful in learning and
using  new  technologies  than  others.  I  believe  that  instead  of  overemphasizing  the
importance of age, we should focus on analogy: those who can find analogies easily are
able to acquire new technologies faster; and those technologies that offer analogies with
their predecessors can be learned more easily than those that claim to be radically new. In
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other words the knowledge that is most urgently required in the age of digital technologies
is neither theoretical nor practical: it is in fact analogical- both on the designers' and on the
users' side.
I agree that the experience of the past is changing these days. I can also understand the
archivists' fear when finding that with digital(ized) documents there is no "here-and-now"
feeling any more: bits and bytes are eternal, they hardly need conservation. But let us
recall that this experience is not new: it has been known at least since the invention of
printing:  already the "traditional"  printed edition of  a  manuscript  text  creates a radical
distance  in  comparison  with  the  "archived"  feeling  of  original  manuscripts.  Moreover,
writing itself is a technology for freezing an oral tradition into an eternal presence -in other
words  what  we  are  facing  here  is  perhaps  an  impact  inherent  in  communication
technologies as such.
However, digitalized texts do have a feature that has not been experienced earlier and
that  I  am worried  about:  present-day  digitalized  texts  are  based  on  the  same quasi-
phonemic  writing  systems  that  were  developed  before  the  age  of  silent  reading  and
writing.  The system successfully  survived the period when the interpretations of  signs
were no longer assisted by the ear, because additional markers were introduced to assist
the  eye:  spaces  between  word-units,  punctuation  marks,  etc.  However  it  can  hardly
survive the digital period, when the interpretation of signs is assisted neither by the ear
nor by the eye, but is  assigned to automated processes working simply on the linear
sequence  of  signs.  Human  languages  are  systems  so  complex  that  they  cannot  be
represented in a one-level linear structure: human readers employ their three-dimensional
sight and vast personal "lexicon" to understand the complex linguistic systems behind the
simple writing system, but sequence-operated machines are not able to do this. Since
present-day  text  retrieval  tools  are  simply  incapable  of  reliably  navigating  in  huge
digitalized text archives, what we may lose is not the experience of the past, but in fact the
knowledge of the past.
3. From what I said about the accessibility of machine-readable quasiphonemic texts it
follows that the technology of writing faces serious problems these days; it could even be
said  perhaps  that  the  technology  of  written  communication  is  in  a  crisis.  Meanwhile,
however,  the  technology  of  audiovisual  communication  is  getting  more  and  more
sophisticated:  new  storage  and  transmission  systems  offer  higher  quality,  more
interactivity, and more precise access through better segmentation. Just to mention a few
promising systems: the interactive compact disk (CD-I), the high capacity digital video disk
(DVD),  real-time  digitalized  sound  through  the  network  (RealAudio),  and  hyperlinked
images and videos on CD-ROMs or on the World Wide Web, etc. In other words, while the
traditional technology of written communication seems to be in a crisis, the development
of audiovisual communication is unlimited. No doubt, audiovisual communication can be
just as concise or complex as its written counterpart, and it can be a narrative medium as
well (compare: traffic signs, great paintings and movies respectively): however, it is not
suited  for  conveying  the  type  of  abstract,  theoretical  knowledge  that  we  usually  call
European science.
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Commenting on Laci  Turi's  comments ("Laci"  being the colloquial  form of  "Lasz1o" in
Hungarian), I would like to remark, first, that I find the concept of analogical knowledge to
be quite  illuminating here.  After  all,  this  concept  played an eminent  role  in  European
medieval philosophy, a philosophy of manuscript culture and intertextuality; it might well
play such a role again in the philosophy of a post-typographical age.
Secondly: I think what Laci says about the new conditions in archiving not being really
new is only partly convincing. Here I would still side with Margaret Hedstrom. As she has
so admirably put it: "Many current institutional practices undermine retention, preservation,
and secondary use of electronic records ...
Even the word archive has lost much of its traditional meaning and associations. In the
vernacular  of  data  processing  professionals,  `archive'  means  to  store  data  off-line.  A
'permanent medium' is one that cannot be erased or altered even if it only lasts a few
years.  These  new  definitions  do  not  incorporate  any  of  the  concepts  that  archivists
normally associate with the term "archive;" to understand information in its context,  to
identify what is valuable, or to retain records and make them accessible as long as they
have value .... some archivists are beginning to question whether fundamental archival
practices, such as provenance and original order, are applicable to the administration of
electronic records. The concepts of original order and provenance derive from the basic
archival  principle  ...  that  much  of  the  meaning  and  value  of  records  derives  from
knowledge of the context in which the records were created. Knowledge of the context of
creation in turn can be ascertained by examining records in their original order and by
studying the administrative history, organizational structure, and functions of organizations
and  the  life  history  ...  of  individuals."  However,  "[e]xcept  for  the  simplest  data  file
structures, the physical ordering of data is controlled by software and is distinct from its
logical 0rder".[ 20]
Thirdly, I agree that not just historical consciousness, but, in part, historical knowledge,
too,  could  be  submerged  in  the  ocean  of  digitalized  texts.  The  loss  of  historical
consciousness, as I suggested in my target paper, might in the end not be a loss at all.
But of  course we would not want to lose sight of  relevant historical  facts.  Here I  see
dangers  on  at  least  three  levels.  At  the  first  level  we have to  realize  that  digitalized
libraries  do indeed have a crippling effect  on conventional  humanities  studies.  Online
public access catalogues tend to focus on recent material, both for monographs and serial
titles. However, as has been repeatedly pointed out, in the humanities new developments
had always been based upon a random survey of the entire corpus of the literature rather
than upon a small selection of recent contributions?[ 21] At a second level, there is a real
danger that virtual library holdings - with magnetic and optical storage media relatively
unenduring, and hardware and software rapidly becoming obsolete - might in a relatively
short  time become irretrievable,  or  else prohibitively  expensive to preserve? Here the
programme of the new Bibliotheque Nationale de France certainly merits attention. The
BNF, to be in full operation by 1998, is meant to be both a giant physical library, and a
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digital on-line library. It is meant, as two of its spiritual architects put it, to "consummate
the  marriage  of  the  universe  of  Gutenberg  with  that  of  McLuhan  ....  it  will  be  open,
democratic, innovative, but all of those things within a perspective ensuring the greatest
respect for the past."[ 23] And at a third level there is the danger Laci points out: that even
knowledge that is preserved digitally  might get lost,  possibly for  ever,  if  the electronic
search mechanisms employed do not happen to be appropriate ones. Lastly, I agree that
in the new communication media western science necessarily loses its abstract character.
The humanities of the future will not have a Platonistic outlook - and the same holds, I
believe, for the science of the future.
After May 20, 1996, the discussion came to a standstill. I had to wait until November 7 to
receive  another  message.  It  came  from  Gergely  Kovesd,  a  student  of  mine  at  the
University of Budapest, a psychology and mathematics major. I am here reproducing his
comments on interactivity and the World Wide Web:
We can provide quite an adequate analysis of e-mail by approaching it from the point of
view of its similarity to primary orality. However, radical changes have occurred with the
extensive spread of WWW.In order to examine these changes it is expedient to use a kind
of continuum-approach to interactivity. It is not enough to take into consideration whether
the communication is two-way or not; we can also speak about a level of lower or higher
interactivity. Two-way communication can be more or less well-balanced and symmetrical.
WWW is situated between face to face interaction and e-mail on the one hand, and the
printed book on the other. Although it is true that e-mail can be sent to the creators of the
hypertext pages, the majority of users only read these pages, seldom comment on them,
and can only rarely influence them.
WWW has brought back the liveliness of face to face interaction, but the character of the
context has changed:
With  face to  face interaction  the  direct  communicational  context  is  constituted by  the
physical environment. With WWW it is the result of the designers' rational planning. Since
such planning consumes time and energy,  it  is  necessary to  construct  web-pages for
encounters as generally conceived as possible. Unless there are considerable editorial
resources, the pages cannot often be changed. As a result, interactivity decreases, and
the stability of the text is much greater than in the case of e-mail.
A few days after I received Gergely's comments, Phil Mullins joined the discussion. This
came about, I am afraid, in an almost old-fashioned way. Herbert Hrachovec had called
my attention to the Ess volume (see note 24), and I started to read the essay by Mullins. I
thought it was excellent; and there was a passage I found particularly relevant:
The word "information" and its soulmate "data" are rather neutral,  technical terms that
often have superseded the term "knowledge" as referents for our preserved cultural lore in
the contemporary era. These terms also suggest our ambivalent attitude toward many of
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the symbolic artifacts produced in the late twentieth century. "Information" and "data" imply
symbolic artifacts without mooring; such uncontextualized material seemingly floats and
accumulates and serves as a reservoir (largely untapped) for the individual inhabitants of
electronic culture. Of course, human beings remain knowers in much the same fashion
they have in earlier eras. To be a knower is a social endeavor that involves contextualizing
such that one becomes an effective agent. A knower recognizes significant relationships
among domains of information. Nevertheless, individuals in electronic culture perceive a
certain  distance  between  personal  life  and  the  larger  environment;  they  sense  a
disconnectedness within the larger framework of expanding information. In part, this is to
say  no  more  than  that  the  suppositions  about  reason  and  the  edifice  of  knowledge
developed in book culture seem to be collapsing. We have at least imagined that there
were  a  finite  number  of  appropriate  classificatory  schemes  within  which  to  locate
ourselves and our experience; but now we seem to be relinquishing this hope for at least
a map of maps. The world of information seems to have lost its human scale; its vastness
leaves us unsteady even if we remain excited about its prospects?[ 4]
In  the  essay  Mullins  makes  a  reference to  an  earlier  paper  of  his:  "Multimedia  as  a
Theoretical  Tool."  Paper  presented  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Society  for  Biblical
Literature,  23  November  1993,  Washington  DC.  [Electronic  document  available  from
<mullins@griffon.mwsc.edu>.] So I wrote to <mullins@griffon.mwsc.edu>, requesting the
document. A lively correspondence began (the document, too, arrived), and soon I found
myself informing Phil about my Monist discussion. I sent him the materials (the "Unity of
Knowledge" paper, referred to as "paper," and the target paper, referred to as "Fragment
2," in the message below). On November 19 he commented on them:
Christoph - I decided to take a night off work and read and think about your paper and
other materials you sent to me. I thoroughly enjoyed your paper. I can also understand
your present unease about the paper's presuppositions about knowledge. I am generally
of  the  opinion  that  what  counts  as  "knowledge"  and  how  we  think  about  "unifying
knowledge" is shaped rather decisively by the technology which we develop and use to
acquire and promulgate knowledge. Clearly, we now are in a transitional place as we shift
rapidly  into  a  culture  more  dependent  on  digital  technology.  Our  former  images
of/understanding  of  knowledge,  and  the  "unity  of  knowledge"  (its  constitution  and
possibility) are shifting under our very feet. This, I take it, is what you suggest also in point
3 in Fragment 2.
You  mention  certain  concerns  in  digital  culture  about  the  matter  of  "historical
consciousness." I suspect that in part the historical consciousness of print culture grew out
of the proliferation of texts and the seemingly natural link between text and social context.
I think digital culture will not be so historically minded about texts. I am not sure whether
this is a positive or negative development; it seems likely to be both. I have argued that
much of  the historical  study of  the Bible has turned out to be simply another form of
naivete as far as the function of sacred texts in cultures is concerned.
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I am puzzled also about the connection between "knowledge" and "information." I think
that  the  image  of  information  as  floating  somewhere  in  the  global  network  is  an
increasingly important cultural image. The network world is in a certain sense beyond the
human scale.
Recently, I have been preoccupied with trying to somehow reclaim the notion of truth in
digital culture. I like the Roycian notion of "being true" or loyal as in some senses an apt
notion  worth  exploring.  I  also  am  more  and  more  drawn  to  C.  S.  Peirce's  semiotic
perspective. He is a realist and I wonder if being a realist is possible in the digital world. I
think Peirce may have been correct in saying that philosophy since the middle ages and
particularly modern philosophy is extraordinarily nominalistic. In other words, I wonder if
digital pluralism can be redeemed from nihilism by some form of realism.
Finally,  your  reflections  on  knowledge  in  digital  culture  provoked  in  me  some further
thoughts about the nature of "meaning" in digital culture. When I send my most recent
paper, you will see that I have become a bit obsessed with questions about "meaning." It
seems to me that in the culture of print it was possible to think about texts as "containing"
meaning  but  that  is  less  possible  in  digital  culture.  "Meaning"  always  lies  ahead  in
electronic texts. One thing inevitably leads to the next in an electronic network. That is,
only a rather strictly pragmatic view of "meaning" is plausible: the meaning of a sign is the
interpretant which itself immediately becomes a new sign, to use Peirce's language.
Phil's reference to his "most recent paper" is to the talk "Making Religious Meaning in
Electronic Culture" he gave at the AAR-Midwest Annual Meeting, March 24, 1996. And
this is, in my reading, from the point of view of the present analysis, the central passage of
the talk:
... in an electronic environment, the meaningful is clearly marked by its fluidity; what is
meaningful appears and disappears and shifts. Nothing stands still in the interactive digital
world; those socialized by the computer regard visible signs as ephemeral and unstable -
as on the way to transformation - rather than fixed. Meaning in an electronic environment
thus  seems most  naturally  to  be  regarded  as  a  relation  between elements  which  an
interested party brings together at a particular time.
However, the passage I am most eager to quote comes from the paper I asked Phil for in
the  first  place  -  his  paper  "Multimedia  as  a  Theoretical  Tool,"  read  at  the  AAR/SBL
Meeting Nov. 23, 1993. This is the passage:
We are  now beginning to  understand that  you can write  with  anything which can be
digitized. Linguistic signs no longer have priority in communication. You can now write by
stringing together provocative images, audio, and conventional written language. Each
medium  may  have  its  special  grammar  and  rhetoric  but  now  hybrid  grammars  and
rhetorics are imaginable. Of course, you cannot necessarily spin out syllogisms in audio or
video or a mixture thereof. But you can make or design unfolding meaning.
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We are back at the issue of the logic of pictures versus verbal logic -the issue that so soon
gained primary significance in the course of these exchanges.
The other main issues were, I  think: interactivity and simultaneity. And, philosophically
speaking,  the  three  paramount  phenomena  bound  up  with  the  rise  of  electronic
communications in general, and multimedia computer networking in particular, are in fact
these: the diminishing importance of the text as opposed to pictures and sounds - the
collapse  of  Platonic  meanings;  the  collapse  of  the  writer/reader  distinction;  and  the
collapse of distance, both spatial and temporal.
"The work of the philosopher," Wittgenstein wrote, "consists in assembling reminders for a
particular  purpose."[25]  I  have  here  assembled  reminders  pertaining  to  the  world  of
computer networking we are all about to enter - assembled them for a particular purpose.
A particular purpose which is, I believe, quite momentous. What this series of exchanges
has shown, I think, is that the nature of the philosophical enterprise has radically changed.
At the time I wrote my paper "Electronic Networking and the Unity of Knowledge" I did not
yet  realize  this.  I  thought  the  task  of  philosophy  was  unmodified  -  even  though  the
phenomena to be analyzed have become so very different. Today I believe that the task
itself is an entirely new one.
Editor: J. C. Nyiri University of Budapest
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